A New World Order: The Rule of Law, or the Law of Rulers? by William Jannace & Paul Tiffany
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 42, Issue 5 2019 Article 2
A New World Order: The Rule of Law, or the
Law of Rulers?
William Jannace∗ Paul Tiffany†
∗
†
Copyright c©2019 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
   
 
1379 
ARTICLE 
A NEW WORLD ORDER: 
THE RULE OF LAW, OR THE LAW OF RULERS? 
William Jannace* & Paul Tiffany** 
 
I.  THE “BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM” .......................1379 
II.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE BWS .........1385 
III.  CHINA, THE US, AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION ........................................................1389 
IV.  USTR REPORT ON CHINA AND THE WTO ...........1396 
V.  B2C: BACK TO CHINA . . . AND GLOBAL 
REALITIES ..................................................................1401 
VI.  WHAT IS TO BE DONE? ...........................................1405 
VII.  CONCLUSION ............................................................1416 
 
I. THE “BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM” 
President Trump’s on-going “trade war” with China is 
symptomatic of broader global changes to the world order that have 
been evolving for decades. To a large degree, these changes 
are grounded in the continuum of modern historical and geopolitical 
trends and a reiteration and possible resuscitation of 19th Century Great 
Power rivalries. This emerging new year in which we write brings with 
it the 75th anniversary of D-Day—and the New World Order ushered 
in by the “American Century” that soon followed.1 The transformation, 
created by the United States and key partners, was affected through 
 
*  Adjunct Professor at Fordham Law School.  
**  PhD is a Senior Lecturer at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
1.  The term “American Century” was coined by Henry Luce, the co-founder of the Time-
Life popular magazine firm, in a prescient essay published in Life in 1941. Henry Luce, The 
American Century, LIFE, Feb. 1941, at 61-65. 
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what we shall refer to as the “Bretton Woods System” (“BWS”) that 
emanated from the Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 1944 in the 
small New Hampshire hamlet of that name. Though that gathering was 
essentially designed to address pressing international financial 
relations following the war (its formal name was the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference), its impact soon extended to the 
political sphere as well, and by extension to associated legal and social 
issues.2 It is within this larger domain that we deploy the BWS 
designation. This weltanschauung, while imperfect and in need of a 
21st Century update, has nevertheless led to unprecedented global 
peace and prosperity over the past seventy-five years.3 
But while changes are warranted, it is our belief that there is no 
reason to fundamentally alter or abandon the foundations of the 
BWS—nor to undermine the enduring principles of political 
democracy, market-based economic transactions, and transparent 
international rules, regulations, and laws on which it was built. 
Unfortunately, we are witnessing today serious attempts to do just that. 
In response, we believe there is a compelling need to reassess the BWS 
in the light of current realities and to formulate, not a new paradigm, 
but necessary correctives that will maintain the benefits of this 
remarkable creation yet will also acknowledge both present and future 
exigencies. To pursue policies contrary to the values inherent in the 
BWS, we assert, would create an existential danger to the world and its 
inhabitants and as such must be confronted and disrupted. 
The BWS was the outcome of sober reflection on the dangers of 
uncoordinated policy decisions made by independent state actors who 
placed their own perceived needs above all else, regardless of collateral 
outcomes. While such behavior might have had relatively negligible 
consequence in prior times, the growth of an interconnected world 
system brought about by advances in technology and trade relations, 
spurred by the leadership of Great Britain in the latter half of the 19th 
Century, now meant that unilateral decision making could have serious 
 
2.  For an informative review of this gathering, see BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON 
WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW 
WORLD ORDER (2013). 
3.  For an informative background on themes discussed in his article, see Who Will Run the 
World? America, China and Global Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2019, Vol. 98, 
No. 1. 
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and potentially mortal spill-over effects for other participants, be they 
actively engaged or innocent bystanders.4 Yet there were few if any 
existing mechanisms to manage this new and increasingly 
interconnected system of international relations; instead, the prior 
pattern of “Great Power” rivalries and intrigues remained in effect. This 
arrangement had prevailed from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 
1814 up to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and its participants 
were the major nation states of the era, essentially all European but later 
joined by both the United States and Japan—rising powers of the late 
19th Century.5 
The result was a world system so fragile that disruption and chaos 
were almost bound to occur at some point—which it finally did in 
horrifying fashion, starting in 1914 and lasting through 1945. While no 
doubt there were many who understood the threat to global peace and 
stability contained in such an archaic arrangement—not the least of 
whom was President Woodrow Wilson and his cherished notion of a 
League of Nations6—the roots of Great Power stasis were simply too 
deep to overcome in any peaceful fashion. Only the unprecedented 
destruction of World War II forced a termination to that old order, 
generating from its ashes a belief by many that finally the time for 
tectonic-level change had arrived. Under new leadership from a 
remarkable union of men, principally Americans who had not 
previously commanded a world stage, these individuals were fiercely 
determined to prevent future catastrophes through a fundamental 
reordering of the fractured world system. 
The result was the conference at Bretton Woods attended by 730 
delegates from the forty-four nations who constituted the Allied forces 
in the war.7 An inspiration for this gathering was the Atlantic Charter 
drafted by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941, 
where clauses 4 and 5 of that document drew a direct line between fair 
 
4.  See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE 
AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, ch. 4 and 5 (1987). 
5. Among others, see id.; ROY BRIDGE & ROGER BULLEN, THE GREAT POWERS AND THE 
EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1814-1914 (2d ed. 2004). 
6.  See ADAM TOOZE, THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR, AMERICA AND THE REMAKING OF 
THE GLOBAL ORDER, 1916-1931 (2014), especially Part III, chapters 13-18.  
7.  See Archive, US DEP’T OF ST., https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/
98681.htm [https://perma.cc/QT33-YQCG] (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
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and rule-based global trade and prospects for global peace and 
prosperity.8 While the US delegation clearly took the lead, this was by 
no means a one-nation show. Indeed, the British economist J. Maynard 
Keynes, the creator of macroeconomics and arguably the greatest 
economic theoretician since Adam Smith, was the principal architect 
of many of the new concepts encased in the BWS.9 Moreover, we 
would also be seriously remiss to overlook the looming shadow of the 
Cold War that soon engulfed global relations in nearly every aspect of 
connectivity. The clash of ideologies represented by the West and the 
Soviet Union were clearly understood by the conference attendees and 
their respective governments.10 But all that being said, it is just as clear 
that principles and concepts enshrined in the American experiment of 
nationhood were the foundational factors in the BWS that ultimately 
emerged.11 Throwing off the historical isolationism that had hindered 
an American role in world affairs for so long, the “greatest generation” 
arose to the challenge and stamped the future with its signature. The 
longue durée that followed—that is, the post-WWII era of relative 
peace and prosperity that we have enjoyed for seventy-five years—is a 
testament to the strength and integrity of that foundation.12 
Nothing, however—as we well know—is forever. Indeed, change 
appears to be the only constant, though its pace does vary. As such, it 
was that the infrastructure of the BWS was perhaps inevitably 
subjected to shifts, some minor and others seismic in nature. The key 
macro factor that altered the post-WWII era was America’s rejection 
of the political isolationism that had characterized much of its previous 
history and in its place an embrace of global economic and political 
engagement, largely driven by the goal of containment of the Soviet 
 
8.  See Hunter Nottage, Trade in War’s Darkest Hour, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/tradewardarkhour41_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZD4T-MN3E] (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
9.  See STEIL, supra note 3.  
10.  See id. See also RAYMOND MIKESELL, THE BRETTON WOODS DEBATES: A MEMOIR 
(1994).  Mikesell, a close friend of chief US representative Harry Dexter White, is often credited 
with being the last surviving economist who attended the conference. 
11.  This reflects the authors’ opinions.   
12. For an informed overview of the influence of liberalist foreign policy on the 
development of US posture in the post-World War II era, see KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE 
STATE AND WAR (1969). For a detailed account of the workings of the conference, see STEIL, 
supra note 3.  
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Union and its opposing ideological claims. As we noted above, the 
economic structure of this enjoinment of the world was based on a 
philosophy of Western values regarding trade and finance: the rule of 
laws and regulations, and adjudicative means to resolve differences as 
they arose.13 These principles were enshrined in the creation of various 
institutions designed to manage outcomes in an orderly and principled 
fashion that valued economic (and related political) stability. These 
included the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World Bank, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”), 
the “Bretton Woods Agreement” itself that set fixed currency exchange 
rates among participant nations, and the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (the GATT, a watered down substitute for the originally 
proposed International Trade Organization (“ITO”) that was vetoed by 
recalcitrant isolationist elements of the Republican Party in the US 
Senate).14  In 1995 the GATT was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) as the principal global body regulating 
international commerce).15 
Over time these and related institutions came to be cogs in what 
was loosely defined as the “Washington Consensus,” that is the basis 
upon which the global economy would operate. The fundamentals were 
a reverence for the market system of exchange and favoritism for 
deregulation over public controls, the liberalization of trade and the 
reduction of cross-border barriers, the preeminence of the private sector 
over state enterprise, and respect for private property and legal 
mechanisms to insure its protection.16 The term Washington Consensus 
was a clear indication of where the seat of power resided, and the values 
that would define it. And though this system was economic in nature, 
our broader definition of the BWS as we use it in this paper is also 
meant to be indicative of its political and legal underpinnings—that is 
democracy, judicial system equity and transparency, a respect for 
 
13.  For background, see the seminal work by the 18th Century French political 
philosopher Charles Montesquieu; this is available in English in MONTESQUIEU: THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989). 
14.  For detailed description of the demise of the ITO, see DOUGLAS IRWIN, CLASHING 
OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY (2017), chapter 10. 
15.  For background, see History of Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm [https://perma.cc/4UHN-3MT6] (last visited Apr. 28, 
2019). 
16.  See IRWIN, supra note 15.  
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individual freedoms such as expression, religion, and other basic 
human rights. Associated institutions meant to capture these principles 
included the United Nations (“UN”) and its several off-shoots (e.g., UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), and 
the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), originally formed in 
1919 and integrated into the UN in 1946), the International Court of 
Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), and many other 
such bodies formed in the post-World War II era to address 
international issues as the nations of the world converged into what has 
been defined as “globalization.” And finally, we could also add 
defense-related organizations such as The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (“NATO”) and the relatively short-lived South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (“SEATO”), as well as various UN agencies 
devoted to non-nuclear proliferation.17 
As this multitude of organizations and institutions took shape, a 
direct result was the opening and deepening of financial, technological, 
and trade channels between nations both large and small, advanced and 
emerging, hemispherically north and south.18  And, as anticipated, 
global wealth and prosperity began to rise. While wealth and income 
distribution obviously did not quickly shift to perfect (or even 
reasonable) equality, the establishment of capitalist regimes in far flung 
corners of the world that had not previously been able to participate in 
such a system did generate hope and aspirations for millions, especially 
so in the so-called “emerging markets.” More significantly, global war 
did not return. 19 
 
17. For interesting commentary on the “consensus” and its faults, see Dani Rodrik, 
Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s 
“Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
973 (2006), available at https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/goodbye-
washington.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7EJ-T46X]. 
18. See IRWIN, supra note 15; RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION (2016).  
19. For data on Gini coefficient and post-War wealth distribution, see among other sources 
Evan Hillebrand, Poverty, Growth, and Inequality Over the Next 50 Years, in Looking Ahead in 
World Food and Agriculture: Perspectives to 2050 (Piero Conforti ed., 2011); UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 72–74 (2011); Bob Sutcliffe, Postscript to the article ‘World inequality and 
globalization,’ OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y (Spring 2004), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/PSBSutcliffe.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VVA-XVLX]. 
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Perhaps the ultimate vindication of the beneficial effects of the 
BWS was the demise and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
December of 1991.20 Yet ironically, if not painfully, a collateral 
outcome of the BWS was the rise of these so-called Emerging 
Nations—especially that of the Peoples Republic of China, an event 
that is arguably the most significant transformation since the 
maturation of the United States as the world’s premier economic power 
in the latter decades of the 19th Century. Moreover, this role reversal 
is one that today portends a possible end to the BWS as we understand 
it. For our purposes in this paper, the rise of China represents a 
powerful threat to the underlying values and principles of what we have 
termed the Bretton Woods System. The question going forward is 
whether or not those values and principles will hold, or will they be 
superseded by a significantly different “consensus” that returns us to 
the world of Great Power rivalries that dominated global relations for 
so long and ultimately ended in the deaths of tens if not hundreds of 
millions of lives and the destruction of much of the civilized world. To 
wit, which way the future? 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF THE BWS 
Some, particularly hard-liners in the Trump Administration such 
as Peter Navarro, the President’s Director of Trade and Manufacturing 
Policy, seem to believe that any accommodation of China’s 
reintegration into the world economy and its role as a responsible 
stakeholder in a US-led BWS should be perceived as a threat to 
American hegemony.21 Others, however, see this relationship as one 
offering tangible benefits for all concerned parties as long as the 
 
20.  See The End of the Soviet Union; Text of Declaration: 'Mutual Recognition' and 'an 
Equal Basis', N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-
soviet-union-text-accords-former-soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XS8-KVFF]. 
21. In 2005, then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s keynote address to the 
National Committee on US-China Relations  called  for China to be a “responsible stakeholder”  
and that “the United States welcomes a conﬁdent, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that 
appreciates that its growth and development depend on constructive connections with the rest of 
the world.” Robert Zoellick’s Responsible Stakeholder Speech, NAT’L COMMITTEE ON U.S. 
CHINA REL., https://www.ncuscr.org/content/robert-zoellicks-responsible-stakeholder-speech 
[https://perma.cc/FZ9A-4J8Q] (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). See also PETER NAVARRO, 
CROUCHING TIGER: WHAT CHINA’S MILITARISM MEANS FOR THE WORLD (2015). 
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fundamental principles of the system remain intact. We agree with the 
latter, though with some caveats. We think it would be far more useful 
to understand and manage the evolving new system of global economic 
relationships not through reliance on such simplifications as “the rise 
of China” or historical paradigms such as a “Thucydides Trap” or other 
such gloss22 (and its equally simplistic notion that this “rise” implies 
America’s decline), but rather through the historical prism of China’s 
return to Great Power status after its “Century of Humiliation” at the 
hands of the West.23 We believe that viewing the 21st Century through 
a narrow lens of binary displacement between the US and China for 
dominance may be misguided as it fails to sufficiently account for the 
complexities of international relations and the role of geography in 
determining and shaping of geopolitical dynamics. The post-Cold War 
world has been witness to various theories that purportedly explain 
international relations, such as “The End of History,” “The Reset of 
History,” “The Clash of Civilizations,” “The World is Flat,” “The 
Revenge of Geography,” “The Rise of the Rest,” and “The G-Zero 
World,” among seemingly countless others.24 While we in no way wish 
to satirize these efforts at explication, each useful within its own 
context, we nevertheless believe that each in isolation does not 
adequately capture the true dynamic of international affairs and the 
changes that are occurring today (admittedly a Herculean effort for a 
single tome). International trade, we assert, is merely symptomatic of 
larger, highly complex, and more profound global forces, which in turn 
require a broader canvas if one desires to competently understand what 
is transpiring in our world system at this time. Thus, while one might 
find temporary comfort in the relatively narrow compartmentalization 
 
22. This concept was popularized by the influential Harvard political scientist Graham 
Allison in 2012. See Graham Allison, Thucydides Trap Has Been Sprung in the Pacific, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b-00144feab49a 
[https://perma.cc/L4QT-X9AF]. 
23. For informative background, see DAVID SCOTT, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM, 1840-1949: POWER, PRESENCE, AND PERCEPTIONS IN A CENTURY OF HUMILIATION 
(2009). 
24. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); Samuel 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993; THOMAS FRIEDMAN, 
THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 21ST CENTURY (2005); ROBERT KAPLAN, THE 
REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY: WHAT THE MAP TELLS US ABOUT COMING CONFLICTS AND THE 
BATTLE AGAINST FATE (2013); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008); IAN 
BREMMER, EVERY NATION FOR ITSELF: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN A G-ZERO WORLD (2012). 
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of systems, trends, and changes covered in these above-cited works 
(especially convenient in a lowest common denominator 
communications environment that favors pithy Tweets and 
Instagrams), a more nuanced and subtle analysis is necessary to 
formulate sound and sustainable policy today.25 
Let us offer one example of what we mean. While there are serious 
concerns about the exponential geopolitical impact of China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (“BRI”) and its apparent intent to restore that nation’s 
stature as a world power,26 there does not seem to be adequate 
discussion about traditional Great Power politics—especially in the 
Asia Pacific region—that might limit the objectives China seems to be 
seeking through the BRI. The role and international posture of India is 
a case in point. That nation, another rapidly growing economy and one 
of the original emerging market nations known as the “BRICs”(that is 
Brazil, Russia, China and India) popularized by the Goldman Sachs 
economist James O’Neill in 2001,27 is also a long-standing geopolitical 
rival of China for regional influence and power. One manifestation of 
that rivalry involves serious differences over national borders in the 
Jammu and Kashmir area of northern India—a problem that led to brief 
armed conflict in the past and which only recently was on the verge of 
more military confrontation between the two nations.28 India is also 
obviously greatly concerned about the emerging China-Pakistan 
economic relationship that has been a product of the BRI. In response,  
India has acted to strengthen alliances with Japan and Australia to, if 
not contain China’s thrust into its immediate region, at least to 
minimize its influence over this next-door neighbor with whom it has 
 
25. For an informative background on this theme see Letting Go, Trump, America and the 
World, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./April 2018, Vol. 97, No. 2.  
26.  See, e.g., RICHARD T. GRIFFITHS, REVITALIZING THE SILK ROAD: CHINA’S BELT AND 
ROAD INITIATIVE (2017); TOM MILLER, CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM: EMPIRE BUILDING ALONG 
THE NEW SILK ROAD (2017); NADÈGE ROLLAND, CHINA’S EURASIAN CENTURY? POLITICAL 
AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (2017). 
27.  See Jim O’Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs, GOLDMAN SACHS (Nov. 
30, 2001), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BG5-6NKF]. 
28.  See Annie Gowen & Simon Denyer, China and India are Dangerously Close to 
Military Conflict in the Himalayas, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-and-india-locked-in-tense-military-
standoff-at-border/2017/08/16/30e7bb42-810c-11e7-9e7a-
20fa8d7a0db6_story.html?utm_term=.20e22344f08b [https://perma.cc/L9Z5-MDSX]. 
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had fraught relations since their joint creation in 1947.29 There are other 
examples, including the resurgence of illiberal regional powers such as 
Turkey and Iran (and their complex historical relations with Russia) 
that will complicate and perhaps inhibit the growth and influence of the 
BRI.30 Suffice it to say that the volatile chess board of the Eurasian 
landmass,31 with its current technological and economic vibrancy, is 
sufficiently complex and charged with its own geopolitical and 
strategic issues that it will not and cannot be resolved solely by China’s 
economic prowess and development initiatives. It will, we assert, 
require engagement by the US-led BWS to achieve stability in this 
region. 
Accordingly, over the past generation we have heard numerous 
calls for reforms to the composition of the UN Security Council to 
reflect the realities of today’s multipolar world, many of which seem 
reasonable on the surface given the dramatic transformation in global 
power centers since the end of World War II. 32  Yet that being said, it 
does not seem plausible that China—a current permanent member of 
the Council33—would advocate for India (or for that matter Brazil,34  
another “BRIC” country) to become permanent members as this would 
surely complicate its growing commercial and political relationships 
with other countries in their respective regions, such as the above noted 
 
29.   See Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (1968). 
30.  See the several analyses of this region provided by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS). Russia and Eurasia, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
https://www.csis.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia [https://perma.cc/W4QH-CDTR] (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2019). 
31.  Eurasia is a term used quite often to refer to the geographic region that links Europe 
and Asia; the OECD lists 13 countries as belonging to Eurasia. For a detailed discussion on this 
topic, see also Christopher J. Fettweis, Eurasia, the “World Island”: Geopolitics, and 
Policymaking in the 21st Century, PARAMETERS, Summer 2000, at 58-71. 
32.  See Richard Butler, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, 1 PENN ST. J. OF 
L. & INT’L AFFAIRS 23 (2012); see also France reiterates support for India’s permanent seat in 
reformed UN Security Council, ECON. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/france-reiterates-support-for-indias-permanent-seat-
in-reformed-un-security-council/articleshow/68250699.cms [https://perma.cc/TTZ2-DY6C].                
33. There are five permanent members of the Council: Russian Federation, China, France, 
UK, and US.  
34. See Butler, supra note 32. 
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Pakistan, or Chile in the Southern Hemisphere.35 China’s visionary 
road to geopolitical global dominance through the BRI and other such 
avenues will likely experience the typical pains of adolescent growth 
when its actions engender resentment among its adversaries as well as 
its trade partners—resentments that have been built on long standing 
historical factors that will not easily disappear simply because China is 
expanding its economic clout through international investment.36 It is 
within these kinds of deeply seated relationships—cultural, political, 
ethnic, and geographic as well as economic— that any envisioning of 
a new world order must find its bearings if it is to have any chance of 
sustainable success.37  
This is a lesson we would assert that applies to the United States 
as well, and perhaps especially so given the Trump Administration’s 
somewhat constrained historical perspective that we have seen 
displayed to date in its approach to international relations.38 As we will 
elaborate below, informed and nuanced American diplomacy can help 
ensure that the world remains relatively peaceful and prosperous, as it 
has since the end of World War II even as the center of economic and 
demographic power shifts eastward. But it will require diplomatic 
competence and diligence, including an appreciation and 
comprehension of history, to get there. Bluster alone, be it from US 
leaders or others, will not move the needle. 
III. CHINA, THE US, AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
In July of 2018 Mr. Dennis Shea, US Ambassador to the WTO 
presented to the WTO General Council a striking rebuke of the trade 
policies of China, comments which he later added to in the 14th Trade 
 
35. Just as, for example, a call by the US for inclusion of Japan or Germany as members 
of the Security Council—which would no doubt elicit rejection by China and France and/or the 
UK, respectively. 
36. This sentence reflects authors’ opinion. 
37. For a deeper discussion on the historical context and narrative of the BRI, see PETER 
FRANKOPAN, THE NEW SILK ROADS: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD (2018), in 
which the BRI is analyzed in the prism of the Chinese axiom of tianxia (all under heaven) which 
places China at the heart of power and civilization. 
38.  See Richard Haass, America and the Great Abdication, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/america-abidcation-trump-
foreign-policy/549296 [https://perma.cc/GC32-CA9J]. 
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Policy Review of the United States given to a panel of WTO delegates 
in December of that year.39 In those prepared remarks he clearly noted 
that one of the most critical issues facing the WTO membership is 
China’s failure to fully embrace the open, market-oriented policies on 
which this institution was founded and to which it remains committed. 
Despite repeated portrayals of itself as a staunch defender of free trade 
and the global trading system, China, this report claims, is in fact 
among the most protectionist economies of the world.40 Contrary to 
members’ expectations, China has not been moving toward a fuller 
embrace of market-based policies and practices since it became a full 
participant in the WTO in 2001 after many years of denied acceptance 
(a controversial move on which we will comment further below).41 In 
fact, the opposite is true; the state’s role in China’s economy has been 
increasing. 42  Were China’s economy small, the problems posed by its 
mercantilist approach to trade and investment would not have as 
serious repercussions for China’s trading partners and the WTO itself; 
any number of the world’s 195 nations have instituted stringent barriers 
towards inward bound trade.43 But China’s economy is not small. Over 
the past seventeen years China’s economy and its role in the global 
trading system have grown dramatically. Measured in Purchasing 
Power Parity (“PPP”),44 China has surpassed the United States in 
annual  Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”)  output; in sheer volume, its 
 
39. For December 2018 remarks, see Statement of the United States by Ambassador 
Dennis Shea at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America, OFF. OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 17, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2018/december/statement-united-states-ambassador 
[https://perma.cc/R268-8A7F]. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Ambassador Shea: China’s Trade-Disruptive Economic Model and Implications for 
the WTO, U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORG. IN GENEVA (July 26, 2018), https://geneva.
usmission.gov/2018/07/27/55299 [https://perma.cc/K63M-98QC] [hereinafter Shea]. 
42.  Id. For a detailed discussion on China’s economy trending back toward state 
ownership, see also generally NICHOLAS LARDY, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: THE END OF 
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (2019) by the Peterson Institute.    
43.  Shea, supra note 41.  
44.  Purchasing power parity is a theoretical exchange rate that allows one to buy the same 
amount of goods and services in every country. The purchasing power parity calculation tells 
how much things would cost if all countries used the US dollar. See Kimberly Amadeo, 
Purchasing Power Parity, How to Calculate PPP and How to Use It, THE BALANCE (Mar. 4, 
2019), https://www.thebalance.com/purchasing-power-parity-3305953 [https://perma.cc/FPT7-
VDZQ]. 
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annualized merchandise trade of over US$4 trillion ranks it as number 
one in the world, ahead of the United States and Germany.45 China’s 
size magnifies the harm caused by its state-led, mercantilist approach 
to trade and investment, and this harm is growing every day and can no 
longer be tolerated.46 If the BWS is to be sustained, states the US 
position, then China must reverse and revise its course—a proposition 
with which the authors agree. 
Ambassador Shea also noted in his July 2018 critique that the 
Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP,” which 
for all intents and purposes is the government of that nation) have a 
constitutional mandate, echoed in China’s broader legal framework, to 
develop a “socialist market economy.”47 To this end, the government 
continues to exercise control directly and indirectly over the allocation 
of resources through instruments such as government ownership and 
control of key economic sectors and government directives to 
individuals with agency in a wide array of firms throughout the 
economy.48 While obvious in the workings of state-owned enterprise 
(“SOE”), this control is exercised in a more subtle fashion in other 
firms through the role of the often invisible “shugi” or CCP hierarchy 
assigned to work alongside the nominal leadership;49 nothing of 
substance transpires at these firms without the consent of this invisible 
hand—that is, the Party—and often it is the Party that directs major 
initiatives by seemingly independent economic incumbents, especially 
as they affect labor force issues.50 
As a result of these interventions, the means of production are not 
sufficiently allocated or priced according to market principles. Instead, 
the government/CCP continues to control or otherwise influence the 
price of key factors of production, including land, labor, energy, and 
capital.51 Just as when China acceded to the WTO in 2001, SOEs 
 
45.  Shea, supra note 41.  
46.  Shea, supra note 41.  
47.  Shea, supra note 41.  
48.  Shea, supra note 41.  
49.  Shea, supra note 41.  
50.  Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the 
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015). 
51.  Id. 
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continue to play an outsized role in China’s economy today.52 
Moreover, the government and the Chinese Communist Party have for 
decades exercised control over these enterprises through the 
appointment of key executives and the provision of preferential access 
to important inputs.53 Recently, the Party also has taken steps to 
increase its strength and presence within all business organizations in 
China; for example, there were well informed rumors that the 
unexpected exit of the ride-hailing firm Uber from China in 2016 and 
the merger of its operations there with local incumbent Didi Chuxing 
was orchestrated by the state as it saw Uber—based in the United 
States—as too powerful a competitor in an industry that was rapidly 
growing and employing tens of thousands of workers.54 It should be 
noted that these non-market outcomes were not limited to 
discrimination only against US business firms operating in China. The 
efforts were apparently so pervasive that the Delegation of German 
Industry and Commerce released a public statement in November 2017 
pushing back against attempts by the Communist Party “to strengthen 
their influence in wholly foreign-owned German companies in 
China.”55 
These behaviors are all in direct opposition to what US political 
leaders in the 1990s thought would result from their acquiescence to 
China’s long-standing pleas for membership in the WTO (a request 
 
52. For more recent concerns, see Li Yuan, Private Businesses Built Modern China. Now 
the Government is Pushing Back, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
10/03/business/china-economy-private-enterprise.html [https://perma.cc/FM6G-874E]. 
53.  One of the authors has a keen personal recollection of exactly this happening. When 
teaching in Shanghai in 2007 at CEIBS (China Europe International Business School, the 
leading business school in the country), one of the executive students noted that there would 
soon be a reorganization at the top of her firm China Telecom, the leading telephone network, a 
point disputed by others in the class due to the relatively strong performance of that company 
whose shares were publicly traded both in China as well as in the US through ADRs. The 
following Monday morning, it was announced that the head of China Mobile, the dominant cell 
phone provider, would take over as head of China Telecom, while the head of the latter would 
move to China Mobile as CEO. There had been no public discussion of this switch in the press 
and no apparent business rationale for the move. It was simply engineered and executed by the 
CCP for its own reasons. 
54.  See, e.g., Brian Solomon, Uber Surrenders in China, Joins Forces With Rival Didi, 
FORBES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/08/01/uber-ends-
billion-dollar-china-fight-makes-peace-with-rival-didi/#1158c90c296f 
[https://perma.cc/PM26-QS4C]. 
55.  Id. 
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first initiated in 1986). At that time President Bill Clinton came to favor 
the notion that the constant harangues for internal reforms to Chinese 
policies in such areas as democracy, human rights (including religious 
freedom), and economic decision making would be more forthcoming 
were the United States to forego its prior negation of Chinese entry.56   
Rather, he reasoned, that entry would spur economic development and 
the rise of a new middle class that would itself demand significant 
reforms from its government.57 That, at least, was the hope. But as we 
have seen, the reality has been quite the opposite. 58  Under President 
Xi Jinping, who rose to power in 2012 and now holds an apparent life-
time appointment, the state and Party have tightened considerably their 
control over almost all aspects of Chinese society, including personal 
freedoms, market transactions, and social/cultural and legal 
institutions.59 In retrospect, President Clinton’s hopes proved illusory 
at best, and plain wrong at worst. The rule of law, as it is understood in 
the West and certainly within the context of the BWS, has simply failed 
to materialize over the 18 years since China joined the WTO.60 
Instead, China’s system of governance treats law as an instrument 
of the state, in the sense that it is used to facilitate the government’s 
industrial policy goals and to secure discrete economic outcomes that 
might not otherwise emerge through purely market driven transactions. 
The courts are structured to respond to the Party’s direction, a fact that 
manifests itself almost daily when one reviews local judicial 
 
56.  See President Clinton’s speech of March 8, 2000, at the SAIS of Johns Hopkins 
University, in which he outlined his views on this subject. Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on 
China Trade Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2000), http://movies2.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/
030900clinton-china-text.html [https://perma.cc/F2EH-36GA]. 
57.  Id. For a detailed discussion of China’s entry into the WTO and various US 
Administrations’ approach to China and trade policy, see RICHARD MCGREGOR, ASIA’S 
RECKONING-CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE FATE OF U.S, POWER IN THE PACIFIC CENTURY (2017), 
especially chapter 6.   
58.   Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning, How Beijing Defied American 
Expectations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 2018, Vol. 97, No. 2.  See also How the West Got 
China Wrong, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/
01/how-the-west-got-china-wrong [https://perma.cc/LNU3-Z5HQ].  
59.  See ELIZABETH ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW 
CHINESE STATE (2018) 
60.  For informative background on the evolution of US-China trade policy and relations, 
see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES (2018), available at 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180706_RL33536_eed6a32ac8ba111bd2a6b944a327f
191664346b3.pdf [https://perma.cc/MND6-USVX] [hereinafter CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES]. 
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decisions.61 For but one recent example, the incarceration of Canadian 
nationals working in China is transparently a quid pro quo related to 
Canada’s arrest and potential extradition to the United States of a 
leading executive of Huawei, the large telecoms equipment 
manufacturer based in Shenzhen and one of China’s leading global 
enterprises.62 Chinese law, it seems, is protean in nature and tends to 
conform not to deeply grounded and transparent principles but rather 
to the exigencies of the moment as understood and interpreted by the 
CCP.63 
Currently, China is seeking to attain both domestic market 
dominance and global leadership in a wide range of advanced 
technologies such as AI, communications, optics, and any number of 
fields related to defense.64 In pursuit of this overarching objective, 
China has of late undertaken major efforts, including the controversial 
“Made in China 2025” industrial plan that was promulgated in 2015.65 
The intent of this ambitious strategic initiative, produced under the 
leadership of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, was to migrate the country 
from its position as a supplier of cheap and low-skilled labor to a 
position of designing and creating high value added goods and services 
in cutting edge technologies that would presumably dominate the 
future global economy.66 It is an aggressive program that was and is 
orchestrated by the state and does not take its cue from market signals; 
its direction and funding come directly from government mandates 
produced by public bureaucrats. A key goal of this Made in China 2025 
initiative is to increase the domestic content of Chinese made or 
 
61.  ECONOMY, supra note 59. 
62.  ECONOMY, supra note 59. 
63.  Authors’ opinion. 
64.  See, e.g., KAI-FU LEE, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER (2018). 
65.  Id. For an overview of the Made in China 2025 program, see the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS, a bipartisan Washington, DC-based think tank) website. Scott 
Kennedy, Made in China 2025 (June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 
[https://perma.cc/YTZ2-JMZ2]. In addition, see Dan Harris, China’s Ten Favorite Industries, 
CHINA LAW BLOG, (August 25, 2015), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2015/08/chinas-ten-
favorite-industries.html [https://perma.cc/BK6Q-F35C], and also see China betting big on these 
10 industries, CHINADAILY (June 30, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2015-
06/30/content_21138379.htm [https://perma.cc/QP9Z-PWK8]. 
66.  China’s BRI supports this program by reallocating lower grade industrial production 
to recipient counties to maintain its high tech and value-added manufacturing domestically. 
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assembled goods to forty percent by 2020 and seventy percent by 2025; 
this will pertain to products in high-tech sectors such as green energy 
processes (e.g., solar power), aerospace, pharmaceuticals, automobiles 
including electric vehicles, communications, IT in general (e.g., 
artificial intelligence (“AI”) and robotics), and other critical industries 
which at the present time in China are dominated by foreign suppliers 
who have a technological lead over national incumbents.67 According 
to reports, the government has committed over US$300 billion in 
public funding to the program—with a goal to supplant the United 
States as the world’s leading technology manufacturing nation by 
2025.68 Much of this is targeted to subsidize the Research and 
Development (“R&D”) outlays which are usually necessary to enable 
major technological breakthroughs, and which in market economies 
typically are supplied only from risk capital provided by private 
interests who seek profits.69 In essence, the Made in China 2025 
program (an extension of its earlier “Indigenous Innovation” policy) is 
designed to create a new Silicon Valley but to do so under the direct 
guidance of the state and with the risks and returns to be borne by the 
state—for its own political purposes. This appears to be a key reason 
why the Trump Administration, in its current “trade war” with China, 
is demanding an end to this program as a condition for tariff relief.70 
However, some have commented that China has no intention of back 
tracking on such an important program and that its commitment to 
change is not credible.71 
China’s industrial policies thus will deploy massive market-
distorting subsidies and provide other forms of financial support for 
targeted domestic industries. But as we have seen in the past, such 
policies can generate the epiphenomena of severe and persistent excess 
production capacity. This in turn can render serious damage to the 
global economy, not only through direct exports from China by the 
 
67.  See Kennedy, supra note 65.   
68.  Kennedy, supra note 65.    
69.  Kennedy, supra note 65.   
70.  See Bob Bryan, China Looks Like It’s Going to Give Trump a Huge Symbolic Trade 
War Win, Fueling Hope for a Big Deal, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-china-trade-war-made-in-china-2025-trump-win-2018-12 
[http://perma.cc/S22L-R4XP]. 
71.  See KAI-FU LEE, supra note 64. 
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subsidized industries, but also because lower global prices stemming 
from the glut of supply make it difficult for even the most efficient 
competing producers to remain viable. This is what has of late occurred 
in the international steel, aluminum, and solar panel sectors—and no 
doubt has made both management and labor leaders in affected industry 
firms enthusiastic supporters of the Trump Administration’s own 
nationalist “America First” economic policies which are themselves 
undermining the Bretton Woods System at this time.72 It should require 
little historical hindsight to realize that similar “beggar thy neighbor” 
economic sentiments are what helped drive nations to war and 
destruction in the days of Great Power politics. 
IV. USTR REPORT ON CHINA AND THE WTO 
On February 28, 2018, Mr. Robert Lighthizer, the current US 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) who has long been concerned with and 
opposed to China’s non-market economic policies, issued President 
Trump’s Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report, outlining how the 
Administration is promoting free, fair, and reciprocal trade and 
strongly enforcing US trade laws.  Among other issues the report notes 
is how the USTR is responding to unfair trade practices, including  
defending US rights and trade remedy laws before the WTO and under  
US trade agreements, asserting that China is not a market economy and 
does not have the right to engage in government interference and 
intervention in market mechanisms, distorting market outcomes and 
undermining WTO rules, without consequence.73     
In June 2018, the White House Office of Trade and 
Manufacturing Policy issued a scathing report illustrating how China 
has pursued a variety of unreasonable actions that harm US intellectual 
property (“IP”) rights, innovation, and technology development.74 
 
72. KAI-FU LEE, supra note 64. 
73.  Trump Administration Sends Annual Trade Agenda Report to Congress, OFF. OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2018/february/trump-administration-sends-annual 
[https://perma.cc/LXP7-HUES] [hereinafter USTR 2017 Report]. 
74.  White House Off. of Trade & Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic 
Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the 
World, WHITE HOUSE (June 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/28NW-DZ5K]. 
2019] A NEW WORLD ORDER 1397 
   
 
These types of policies and practices injure not only the United States 
but also other WTO Members.75 Moreover, the report notes that China 
continues to benefit asymmetrically from its WTO membership. That 
country is now the world’s largest automotive market, the world’s 
largest oil importer, the world’s largest steel manufacturer, and the 
world’s largest meat consumer.76 The report further notes that while 
China undoubtedly struggles with poverty-related challenges in some 
areas of its economy, especially the rural agricultural sector, the claim 
that it is a “developing country,”77 on par with many others such as 
those located in sub-Saharan Africa—and therefore should be exempt 
from abiding by or contributing to progressive liberalization of global 
trade rules—is simply not credible, when measured against numerous 
indicators of China’s rapid development and accumulation of wealth 
over the past thirty years.78 Indeed, many economists now fear that 
China is falling into the “middle income trap,” a position hardly 
compatible with the status of a “poor nation.”79 
 
75.  In addition to foregoing sales of original products to counterfeited goods, or to Chinese 
products using their know-how, non-Chinese companies also often need to lower their prices to 
compete in China due to these actions. These firms spend billions of dollars to address possible 
infringements, according to a 2011 report by the US International Trade Commission. That 
report said trademark infringement was the most common form of IP violation in China, but 
copyright infringement was the most damaging; it estimated that US IP-intensive firms lost 
US$48 billion in 2009 because of Chinese infringements. While China has made some efforts 
to improve its oversight and enforcement of laws prohibiting such behaviors, they nevertheless 
continue. See Grant Clark and Shelly Hagan, What’s Intellectual Property and Does China Steal 
It?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22  , 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-
22/what-s-intellectual-property-and-does-china-steal-it-quicktake [https://perma.cc/R934-
ZJ28]. 
76.  See USTR 2017 Report, supra note 73. 
77.  For example, in 2017, while China started a nationwide campaign to protect foreign 
firms’ international property rights, its Ministry of Commerce noted that China is a developing 
country and doesn’t have a perfect system to protect IP, acknowledging that there’s much work 
to do. Of 50 countries in the US Chamber of Commerce’s International IP Index, which 
measures a country’s commitment to fostering and protecting innovation through legal rights, 
China ranks 25th (the United States is ranked first). While China earned praise in that survey for 
its reforms on patent and copyright protections, and its efforts to raise awareness of IP rights, it 
was still criticized for continuing high levels of infringement and insufficient legal safeguards. 
See supra note 76. 
78.  See Damien Ma, Can China Avoid the Middle Income Trap?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 
12, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/12/can-china-avoid-the-middle-income-trap-five-
year-plan-economy-two-sessions [https://perma.cc/2RK8-J4S2]. 
79.  Id.  
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Since joining the WTO in 2001 China has repeatedly signaled that 
it is pursuing economic reforms. However, its use of the term “reform” 
differs from the type and kind of reform that a country would be 
pursuing were it embracing market-oriented principles. For China, 
economic reform typically implies perfecting the government’s and the 
CCP’s management of the economy and strengthening the state sector, 
particularly SOEs who employ large numbers of people,80 so as to 
maintain its legitimacy as part of the social contract that the Party 
imposed on the country in 1949 when Mao’s revolution succeeded. In 
essence, Chinese citizens would enjoy economic development and a 
rising standard of living, but they would attain these benefits only in 
the absence of full political participation. Political decisions and 
outcomes remain the purview of the Party, not an electorate in any real 
sense of that term and the democratic processes that it implies.81 As 
long as China remains on this path, we would assert, the probabilities 
for the WTO to convince China to “reform” its economic policies 
remain problematic.82 
China’s response to criticism about its trade-disruptive economic 
model is to assert that China strictly adheres to its WTO obligations, 
holds itself out as a “model” for other WTO members to emulate, and 
asserts that it “firmly observes and upholds the WTO rules and supports 
the multilateral trading system that is open, transparent, inclusive and 
non-discriminatory.”83 Many, however, disagree. The aforementioned 
2017 USTR Report notes that China had agreed to revise hundreds of 
laws, regulations, and other measures to bring that nation into 
conformity with its WTO obligations, as required by the terms set forth 
in its Protocol of Accession.84 US policymakers hoped that these terms 
would dismantle existing state-led policies and practices that were 
incompatible with an international trading system expressly based on 
open, market-oriented policies and rooted in the principles of 
 
80.  ECONOMY, supra note 59. 
81.  See CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 
(Robert Ross & Jo Bekkevold eds., 2016). 
82.  U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance, 
OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Press/Reports/China 2017 WTO Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAJ7-5GPD]. 
83.  See USTR 2017 Report, supra note 73. 
84.  USTR 2017 Report, supra note 73. 
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nondiscrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness, and 
transparency. But those hopes were dashed, and repeatedly so. China 
largely remains a state-led economy today, and the United States and 
other trading partners continue to encounter serious problems with 
China’s trade regime.85 Meanwhile, China has used the imprimatur of 
WTO membership to become a dominant player in international trade. 
Given these facts, as we have suggested repeatedly above, in retrospect 
it now seems clear that the US erred in supporting China’s entry into 
the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing 
China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime.86 
Today, almost two decades after it pledged to support the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO, China pursues a wide array of 
continually evolving interventionist policies and practices aimed at 
limiting market access for imported goods and services from foreign 
suppliers. At the same time, China offers substantial government 
guidance, resources, and regulatory support to Chinese industries, 
including initiatives designed to extract advanced technologies from 
foreign companies in sectors across the economy, as a requirement for 
those firms to gain access to the large local market. The principal 
beneficiaries of China’s policies and practices are Chinese SOEs and 
other significant domestic companies attempting to move up the 
economic value chain.87 
The USTR Report noted that this situation is worse today than it 
was five years ago.88 While some of the legal changes and related 
economic reforms that China made in the years immediately following 
its WTO accession offered the potential for a fuller embrace of market 
principles (for example, there was a decided reduction in tariff barriers 
for exports to that country), over time these efforts stalled. Despite 
Chinese pronouncements to the contrary, the state’s role in the 
economy has increased, as have the breadth and depth of concerns 
 
85.  USTR 2017 Report, supra note 73. 
86. USTR 2017 Report, supra note 73. See also MCGREGOR, supra note 58.  
87. A comprehensive review of China’s alleged violations of trade policies was published 
by the Trump Administration in 2018. See White House Off. of Trade & Manufacturing Policy, 
supra note 75. This report, it should be noted, was written under the auspices of Mr. Peter 
Navarro, President Trump’s trade advisor who has a long history of objecting to China’s 
economic and political policies. 
88.  White House Off. of Trade & Manufacturing Policy, supra note 75. 
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facing US and other foreign companies seeking to do business in China 
or attempting to compete with favored Chinese companies in their 
home markets.89 Since China’s accession to the WTO and up to the 
current Trump Administration, the United States has repeatedly 
attempted to work with China in a cooperative and constructive 
manner.90 Using intensive, high-level bilateral dialogues, the United 
States has sought to resolve significant trade irritants and also to 
encourage China to pursue market-oriented policies and become a 
more responsible member of the WTO.91 These bilateral efforts largely 
have been unsuccessful– not because of failures by US policymakers, 
but because reciprocal Chinese policymakers both appear and act 
uninterested in moving toward a true market economy. 
We do find it encouraging, however, that the US is not retreating 
totally into a posture of economic isolationism, despite contrary views 
from President Trump in both his presidential rhetoric and his 
administration’s actions. To do so, we believe, would only insure a 
regression to the past that would lead to catastrophic geo-
political/economic outcomes. Yet an insufficiently researched question 
is the motivation behind China’s behavior in what the United States 
and others believe is non-compliance with the rules and regulations of 
global commerce. Is there some surreptitious rationale for this, perhaps 
having to do with a desire by Chinese leaders to supplant the US as the 
global hegemon and “take over the world,” as some on the right have 
surmised?92 Or is the issue one of miscommunication or 
misunderstanding perhaps best recognized as a clash of cultures—
stemming from an assumption that the rule of law resonates as 
powerfully in China as it does in the West? We will return to this 
question below. 
 
89. CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES, supra note 61, at 31-57. 
90.  CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES, supra note 61, at 31-57. 
91.  CHINA-US TRADE ISSUES, supra note 61, at 31-57. 
92.  See, e.g., Joe Hildebrand, China’s Secret Plan to Take Over the World, NEWS.COM.AU 
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/chinas-secret-
plan-to-take-over-the-world/news-story/cd114b46e10194325422e2ef3f4eb5db 
[https://perma.cc/N2HH-2U54]. 
2019] A NEW WORLD ORDER 1401 
   
 
V. B2C: BACK TO CHINA . . . AND GLOBAL REALITIES 
China has proven more than capable to engage in a 21st Century 
version of mercantilism without having yet to resort (and we empathize 
yet) to more atavistic means to advance its perceived domestic and 
global trade interests.93 The nation’s ongoing interactions with both 
African and Latin American nations to secure natural resources and 
influence are but one example, while its BRI to alter the prevailing 
geopolitical landscape and global world order—though of late hitting 
some road bumps—is another.94 Easily added to this list would be the 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”), a new global 
development bank from China that mimics the World Bank created by 
US-led Allies as part of the BWS in 1944, and The New Development 
Bank, led by China with its “BRICS”95 partners.96 Regrettably, the 
AIIB came about in part due to prior US Administrations’ inability to 
secure Congressional approval to proposed changes to the IMF that 
would bestow new voting procedures to reflect China’s increased role 
and prominence in the global economy.97 Equally important to note is 
 
93.  This reflects the authors’ opinion; it is our reasoned opinion based on the totality of 
what we have written here and in prior publications.   
94.  Also, China’s TPP equivalent Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”), is encumbered by the divergent interests and perspective of its members as it is not 
considering rules on the regulation and transparency of SOEs, the prevention of corruption, and 
guarantees of workers’ rights, all of which are included in the TPP. In this regard, China is averse 
to services liberalization. Meanwhile, India is prioritizing services liberalization and Japan and 
Australia are seeking comprehensive goods and services liberalization in the same manner of 
the CPTPP. See Mie Oba, TPP, RCEP and the Liberal Economic Order, Proponents of the 
Liberal Economic Order Have Reason to be Concerned, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/tpp-rcep-and-the-liberal-economic-order 
[https://perma.cc/V7YB-TU59]. 
95.  For the BRICS acronym, see supra note 27 above. The final “S” was added by China 
in 2010 when it invited South Africa to join the original group of four nations—Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China. O’Neill, supra note 27. 
96.  In addition, regional facilities have been put together to provide support at times of 
financial distress, including the Chiang Mai Initiative which pools foreign-exchange reserves of 
the ASEAN+3 countries and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement, which BRICs members 
can rely upon. For details, see Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, Bangko Sentral Ng 
Pilipinas (Jan. 2019), http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/FAQs/CMIM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3U5V-6C8Q]. 
97.  See Leonid Bershidsky, IMF Reform Is Too Little, Way Too Late, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
18, 2015) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-12-18/imf-reform-is-too-little-
way-too-late [https://perma.cc/95ZG-8NKL]. See also Edwin M. Truman, IMF Quota and 
Governance Reform Once Again, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 2018), 
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that it also started despite the US lobbying its allies not to join.98 While 
the Trump Administration has of late pursued several initiatives to, if 
not reverse, then at least mitigate the formation and potential influence 
of the AIIB and other Chinese global economic initiatives (such as the 
BUILD Act [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development 
Act of 2018] and the ARI Act [Asia Reassurance Initiative]), these 
appear relatively mild compared to the magnitude of China’s 
aggressive global agenda. In fact, in the area of multilateral trade 
agreements and despite the Administration’s stated abhorrence of the 
constraints and inequities of such agreements, voiced in conjunction 
with its unfortunate and ill-advised withdrawal from the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”), it did negotiate successfully the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) to replace The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), a twenty-five-year-old 
pact in need of substantive revisions due to evolving conditions in the 
global economic environment—though we should note that as of this 
writing Congressional approval of the USMCA remains problematic. 
While time will tell if these changes were merely face-saving 
cosmetics for a President desperate for a “win” given his campaign 
rhetoric, the outcome could have been significantly worse, such as total 
abnegation of NAFTA with no successor program in its place.99 The 
realities of living in a globally interdependent world where allies (e.g., 
Greece and the Mediterranean area of the European Union teetering on 
 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y84A-9CVE]; Mark 
Weisbrot & Jake Johnston,  Voting Share Reform at the IMF: Will it Make a Difference?,  CTR. 
FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (Apr. 2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/IMF-voting-shares-
2016-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RB7-P23E]. 
98.  Matthias Sobolewski & Jason Lange, U.S. urges allies to think twice before joining 
China-led bank, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-asia-
bank/u-s-urges-allies-to-think-twice-before-joining-china-led-bank-
idUSKBN0MD0B320150317 [https://perma.cc/BAS3-XA7G]. See also Joseph Stiglitz, Why 
America Doesn’t Welcome China’s New Infrastructure Bank, HUFFPOST (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/america-china-investment-bank_b_7055222 [https://perma.cc/
W5LZ-92LX]. 
99.  Katie Lobosco, Trump poised to make NAFTA ultimatum to congressional Democrats, 
CNN (Dec. 5, 2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/05/politics/trump-nafta-threat/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/WL69-SKFT]. See U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade 
Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, U.S. INT’L 
COMMISSION (Apr. 2019), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4889.pdf?source=
govdelivery&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/P6WZ-QT8B]. 
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insolvency) can do almost as much harm as enemies (e.g., Russia and 
revanchist policies in its Near Abroad) are sobering reminders that the 
conduct of unilateral, neo-isolationist, transactional foreign policy only 
forestalls the inevitability of engaging internationally, though at much 
higher costs and with fewer options for goal achievement. One need 
only be reminded of America’s delayed entry into WWII to realize this. 
These trade policy initiatives at least minimally acknowledge that 
in spite of the Trump Administration’s “America First” platform  and 
its constant demand for redress of Allied imbalances with respect to 
financial burden sharing, it still recognizes that the US must engage 
globally on some level.100 This is both positive and welcomed, because 
the goal of China in its global economic policies and ambitions, we 
claim, has been to reassert its status as a Great Power and to do so at 
the expense of the US-led BWS that has been so beneficial to so many 
for the past seventy-five years (not the least of whom have been the 
citizens of China themselves). To overturn that in favor of an autocratic 
regime that denies democracy, minimizes personal freedoms, and seeks 
state control of key economic institutions and behaviors would be 
imprudent and counterproductive to both China and the world.  
Notwithstanding China’s stated goal to uphold the international 
global order of free trade,101 its decision to ignore a ruling against it in 
a key legal case over control of strategic reefs and atolls in the South 
China Sea seems inconsistent with its aforementioned policy of 
compliance with international law.102 The judgment in that case from 
an international tribunal in the Hague was in favor of claims by the 
 
100.  See John Hudson et al., Trump Invokes New Demand for Extracting Billions of 
Dollars from US Allies, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/trump-invokes-new-demand-for-extracting-billions-of-dollars-from-
us-allies/2019/03/09/d472b9cb-09d5-481e-9475-
291378986dbb_story.html?utm_term=.313113489ae7 [https://perma.cc/SFX4-SLS4]. 
101.  See President Xi’s 2018 speech at the annual World Economic Forum held in Davos 
and various articles on this topic. President Xi’s speech to Davos in full, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-
world-economic-forum [https://perma.cc/VUL5-LTRW]; Kim Hjelmgaard & Donna Leinwand 
Leger, Davos: China's Xi invokes Gettysburg Address in defense of free trade, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/17/china-xi-jingping-
davos-world-economic-forum/96658058 [https://perma.cc/J9WX-5XLC]. 
102.  Campbell & Ratner, supra note 58; ECONOMIST, supra note 59. 
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Philippines.103 China’s President Xi noted that China’s territorial 
sovereignty and marine rights in the seas would not be affected by the 
ruling, which declared large areas of the sea to be neutral international 
waters or the exclusive economic zones of other countries.104 While it 
is concerning, equally disquieting is the fact that no permanent 
members of the UN Security Council have ever complied with a ruling 
by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea. In fact, none of 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have ever 
accepted any international court’s ruling when (in their view) it 
infringed on sovereignty or perceived national security interests.105 
While it may seem antithetical to American views to ask whether China 
should do as we say, or, by contrast, as we do, it is even more 
disconcerting in the face of the “America First” policies of the Trump 
Administration.106 Those policies, at least when taken at face value, 
appear to seek disengagement from the world, or at least embracement 
 
103. The PCA delivered its award in the Philippines’ case against China over maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea. In a bid to thwart Beijing’s attempt to turn the South China Sea 
into its own sovereign territory, the Philippines contended that China’s claim to exclusive 
sovereignty over all the islands and shoals within the so-called “nine-dashed line” – which 
encompasses 86 percent of the Sea – has no basis in international law. See Permanent Ct. of 
Arb., The Tribunal Renders Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility; Will Hold Further 
Hearings, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. PRESS RELEASE (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1503 [https://perma.cc/72VQ-HVW4]. For details 
of this episode, see Tom Phillips et al., Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in South China Sea case, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-
wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china [https://perma.cc/K6UH-JL4H]. 
104.  Id. 
105. In the Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986), the ICJ ruled 
in favor of Nicaragua and against the US and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. The ICJ held 
that the US had violated international law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against 
the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua’s harbors. The US refused to participate 
in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the case. The US also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the UN Security Council and 
thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any compensation. Nicaragua subsequently 
withdrew the complaint from the court in 1992 following a repeal of the law which had required 
the country to seek compensation. (This case was adjudicated against the background of the 
“Contra Wars” being waged in Central America by the Reagan Administration-—factors that 
may have influenced both the jurists in this case as well as the US rejection of proceedings). For 
its summary, see Nicaragua v. United States of America ICJ Judgment of 27 June 1986, H2O 
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/text_blocks/29108 [https://perma.cc/JF3Z-PU5R]. 
106.  David A. Graham, ‘America First’: Donald Trump's Populist Inaugural Address, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-
inaugural-speech-analysis/513956 [https://perma.cc/P6ZV-MCPV]. 
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of a more transactional basis rather than adherence to well established 
laws and precedents—an approach that would seem to provide China 
with reason to further pursue such conduct in support of its own 
interests, rather than comply with the existing framework of the BWS 
and its foundational principles. Is this the appropriate way forward as 
the BWS faces fierce headwinds of change that might lead to its 
disintegration? 
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
“Hitherto,” observed Marx, “philosophers have sought to 
understand the world; the point, however, is to change it.”107 Is 
President Trump correct in his stated belief that the BWS System needs 
change, regardless of the underlying rationale? While a retreat from the 
BWS leaves understandable worry from a macro geopolitical 
perspective, there is also reason to promote a sense of optimism that it 
can be altered and improved upon without sacrifice of its basic 
principles or a reversion to an era of Great Power politics of the past. 
Some people—and we include ourselves in this—are deeply concerned 
over the potential impact of President Trump’s disengagement from the 
20th Century world order that the United States created and led for so 
long. This retreat has spawned the poisonous ancillaries of social 
tensions stoking populism, populism stoking social tension, trade 
friction stemming from “America First” policies, a surge in internally 
displaced people and refugees, and other social, economic, political, 
and cultural issues effecting all countries. For too many, the “rise of 
China” can account for much of the chaos in which we find the world 
today, and as such the simplistic nostrums offered by President Trump 
and the easy encomiums of his own “greatness” would appeal to his 
followers to be the only way out. We find this both risible and indeed 
dangerous. 
It should be clear by now that the authors of this Article strongly 
favor retention of the Bretton Woods System. As described above, this 
would include the market mechanism to determine what is produced 
and how it is distributed, transparent laws and regulations to oversee 
 
107.  See Lev Churbanov, "Preface" to Karl Marx–Frederick Engels Collected Works: Vol. 
5: Marx and Engels, 1845–47. N.Y. Int’l Publishers, 1976, p. xiv. 
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economic behavior, an independent judicial system to resolve disputes, 
democratic processes to choose public leaders, supporting institutions 
to facilitate process, and respect for individual rights, among other 
principles.108 And, of course, the BWS advocates free trade among the 
nations. However, while these pillars of the system should not be 
altered in any fundamental manner, we have also argued that the 
evolved global political economy of the 21st Century does justify 
revisions that would better align its framework with today’s realities. 
We noted earlier in this review that the divide separating China 
and the West, in terms of trade policy, is perhaps due to a “clash of 
cultures” as much as anything else.109 An insufficiently explored 
subject is the rationale for China’s rejection of international law: is it 
due to a desire to overturn the “system” and replace it with one that 
implants China as the global hegemon? This would be a seeming replay 
of Great Power politics of the past, but now with a new protagonist on 
the stage. For those who hold such a perspective, it greatly simplifies 
the rationale to oppose China’s ambitions as well as the need to 
undertake more nuanced analysis into the motivation for its (presumed) 
objectives: “if they ‘win’ then it must imply that we ‘lost’”—and who 
would want to lose? Accordingly, stop the rise of China! Impose tariffs, 
limit investments, impugn its leaders, win a big beautiful victory! 
Unfortunately, this reductionist approach downplays reasoned 
analysis, or at the least it fails acceptable standards of serious 
investigation. A more informed approach, we would assert, requires a 
deeper dive into China’s cultural norms and beliefs and how they might 
animate its leaders’ perspectives on economic transactions and 
relations. Western cultural traditions, as we know, arose out of the 
ancient worlds of Greece and Rome, which incorporated an 
appreciation of laws and obligations of the citizenry to abide by 
them.110 Accompanying Judeo-Christian values became enmeshed in 
the social and political fabric of Western nations, and helped form the 
basis of what we have termed the BWS: laws were codified based on 
theories of social justice and equity, and the needs of the state were 
 
108.  See Part I above, The “Bretton Woods System.” 
109.  See Part IV above, USTR Report on China and the WTO, especially the end 
paragraph 
110.  See J. M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992).  
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carefully balanced against personal rights of individual citizens—that 
is, a social contract between citizen and state was enjoined.111 The 
desire for personal power was clearly acknowledged, but mechanisms 
were created to prevent damage to the collective needs of the whole by 
those who would abuse their power—typically achieved through a 
system of laws and courts.112 Absent such constraints, it was correctly 
assumed, purely self-aggrandizing behavior could lead to a Hobbesian 
state in which brute force alone would dominate and stability would be 
constantly at risk as the fight for power and privilege took its toll.113 
Democratic political institutions, it might be added, were critical to the 
preservation of stability as they provided for a safety valve that could 
be invoked if the finely balanced system of regulated restraints gave 
way to tyrannical behavior by elites in power. The tyrant could be voted 
out. 
As we have seen, the economic benefits of globalization 
eventually broke down past barriers that had limited free trade.114 
Though not without friction and costs, these aggregate benefits proved 
substantial enough to spread to most sectors of society in most regions 
of the world following the termination of hostilities in 1945.115 Yet as 
the BWS that enshrined the principles underlying this arrangement of 
economic interchange began to fray with the rise of China in particular 
and the Asia-Pacific region in general,116 concomitant questions 
regarding their universality also emerged.117 Should outcomes be a 
function of compliance with stated rules, regulations, and laws, or 
should each case be weighed on its own merits regardless of any 
broader legal context? And if so, who was to decide? The “trolley 
problem” of ethical choice, involving deontological vs. 
consequentialist approaches—that is, utilitarianism vs. a rules-bound 
 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
115.  Id.  
116.  One should not forget the trade violations committed by Japan in the 1970s and 
1980s. See LAURA TYSON, WHO’S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES (1992) for a balanced review. 
117.  Id. 
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system—emerges.118 The issue is one of universal values, and 
especially those involving Chinese approaches to cross-border trade, 
intellectual property ownership rights, government funding of business 
firms, “social stability” needs and their maintenance, and the like, as 
opposed to the foundational principles of Western society that underpin 
the BWS.119 Is there a “Confucian” system of values that differs from 
the West in areas critical to global commerce? To work well, 
globalization and global trade require an even playing field—which 
implies that all actors in the game have and abide by similar values. Is 
this in fact the reality of the highly diverse world in which we live 
today? Even within our Western sphere, let alone on a global basis, the 
current political divisiveness in numerous nations might give one pause 
as to the answer. 
However, while we are sympathetic to the diversity of peoples and 
their values the world over, we disagree that global commerce should 
conform to different rule regimes in different geographies. Indeed, 
there can be no “global” commerce under such conditions: trade 
becomes purely transactional. As we saw when bi-lateral trade 
agreements were the norm in the United States, prior to a turn to 
multilateralism under FDR’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the 
1930s, instability was the typical result for the global economy.120 In 
essence, this was the Great Powers problem. 
But we are also cognizant of the difficulties inherent in 
establishing a rules-based multilateral system. These are, admittedly, 
not insignificant; they involve time-consuming negotiations to reach 
agreements among the many participants (one need only to recollect 
the failed Doha Round of the WTO to understand this).121 Moreover, 
in democratic regimes where vested local interests have much to either 
gain or lose through outcomes, there is enormous pressure on trade 
negotiators to achieve certain results, regardless of their equity for 
 
118. Among other sources, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 
1395 (1985). 
119.  This reflects the Authors’ opinion. 
120.  See IRWIN, supra note 15. 
121.  See Kimberly Amadeo, DOHA Round of Trade Talks, THE BALANCE (Jan. 5, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-doha-round-of-trade-talks-3306365 
[https://perma.cc/AK58-YADD]. 
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all.122 And, to compound the difficulties, a nation’s citizenry needs to 
agree to the system and its results—which can strain even the most 
involved of observers given the often-times mind-numbing complexity 
of trade rules and regulations, most of which hardly lend themselves to 
persuasive communication in the current climate of thirty-second 
sound bites and forty-character Tweets.123 
But we must again return to the past in support of our 
recommendations: without such a framework—our BWS—the danger 
to civil society is magnified tenfold or more. The required effort is 
demanding, certainly, but the costs of failure are far greater. 
Accordingly, what we do advocate is refinement and revision rather 
than termination.124 We believe several key changes are necessary 
today: 
1. To remain relevant in a 21st Century multipolar BWS, the 
WTO (as well as the IMF) must align representation with countries’ 
relative economic weight, and systemic importance with 
commensurate responsibilities to maintain the global trading and 
financial system. The decision-making apparatus, benefits, and 
responsibilities of these necessary institutions should be amended to 
give greater weight, influence and responsibilities to new economic 
actors, specifically China.125 However, this change should be strictly 
 
122.  This reflects the Authors’ opinion. 
123.  This reflects the Authors’ opinion. 
124.  For additional insights on the author’s views on the BWS, see William Jannace & 
Paul Tiffany, Bretton Woods 4.0 Finding New Relevance in a New World Order, THE BRETTON 
WOODS COMMITTEE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.brettonwoods.org/article/bretton-woods-4.0-
finding-new-relevance-in-a-new-world-order [https://perma.cc/KTT5-HVRW].  See also 
William Jannace & Paul Tiffany, Accounting for Trade: President Trump and the “Geopolitical 
Balance Sheet”, NYU GLOBAL AFF. PERSP. ON GLOBAL ISSUES (Spring 2017), 
http://pgi.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/PGI.SP17.FINAL_.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ6V-
NN9A].  
125. China continues to borrow an average of US$2 billion a year from the World Bank, 
making it one of the top borrowers—despite being the world’s second-largest economy and itself 
a major global lender. The IBRD has loaned more than US$7.8 billion to China since the country 
surpassed the bank’s “graduation” income threshold for lending in 2016. The World Bank’s 
current threshold to trigger IBRD country graduation discussions is US$6,895 in gross national 
income (GNI) per capita. Lending to countries above this threshold has been controversial, with 
the US critical of ongoing lending to China. Critics have pushed for strict graduation standards 
that would make wealthier borrowers ineligible for bank loans (i.e., “graduation”). Under the 
2018 agreement, World Bank shareholders agreed to limit loans to countries above the threshold 
to only projects that focus on: global public goods (projects that benefit the world at large); and, 
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contingent on verifiable commitments by China to abide by the WTO 
as a developed—not developing—country, and to assume 
responsibilities under the IMF commensurate with its financial 
strength.126 
2. The United States should acknowledge the benefits of the AIIB 
in its investment projects throughout the world that enhance local 
needs; moreover, the United States should pursue either membership 
or observer status, and in this role advocate for enhanced governance 
and transparency in the organization. At the same time, however, the 
United States should not abandon the World Bank and its mission, but 
rather should spearhead continued efforts to facilitate coordination and 
cooperation between these two institutions (as well as the Asian 
Development Bank and The New Development Bank). If, at some 
future point, it becomes apparent that a single entity is best positioned 
to accomplish objectives, then a merger should be pursued. 
3. The United States and its traditional BWS allies should assume 
a leadership position in facilitating an expansion of South-to-South and 
East-to-East trade and commerce. This initiative should be undertaken 
with an explicit goal of not undermining or threatening China’s BRI 
program, but rather with complementing it in a manner that leads to 
increased prosperity in both African and Latin American nations. 
 
capacity-building (projects that help the countries “graduate” away from World Bank lending). 
Given its climate and environmental issues, China has been able to avail itself of this program. 
See Scott Morris & Gailyn Portelance, A Closer Look at the World Bank’s Sizable China Portfolio, 
CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.cgdev.org/blog/closer-look-world-banks-
sizable-china-portfolio [https://perma.cc/LDE2-NTR4]. 
126. A critical issue with the current structure of the WTO system is its negotiation 
function based upon the consensus principle (involving all 164 members). This has proven too 
rigid, and as such unable to facilitate improvements in the trade rule system. Further 
exacerbating this problem is that the WTO remains grounded in an outdated approach to 
flexibilities, which allows over two-thirds of its membership—including China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa and Indonesia—to claim, “special and differentiated treatment” (SDT). See also 
PK Vasudeva, “Reforming WTO,” The Statesman (Oct. 8, 2018), at 
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/reforming-wto-1502694011.html 
[https://perma.cc/B3BQ-FH4M] for informative commentary. We should note, however, that 
the Trump Administration currently appears to be undertaking measures that would undermine 
the WTO rather than reform it—a position with which we strongly disagree. One reason for our 
disagreement is that the US has benefitted perhaps more than any other nation from WTO rulings 
and procedures. See Jeffrey Schott, US-China Trade Friction: The WTO Dimension, PETERSON 
INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/schott2019-01-
23ppt.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8YP-WYVK]. 
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4. The US should take the lead in updating laws and rules 
pertaining to Intellectual Property. Patent laws for the protection of IP 
were a function of a world in which physical goods predominated and 
cross-border trade was limited. Yet today technology is increasingly 
embodied in intangible services that move instantaneously across 
borders, rather than in tangible products; indeed, we are rapidly moving 
into the “digital era” of global commerce.127 China, as we have noted, 
has not abided by IP commitments made under its WTO membership 
and has caused significant damage to Western firms as a result.128 
Within the context of the WTO and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”), the US should therefore advocate for tougher 
standards regarding IP protection (and China, it might be noted, 
continues to file patents at a growing pace even as it seeks protection 
from the very system it has previously taken advantage of).129 
However, in the spirit of cooperation and compromise that we think is 
necessary to the creation of a viable world system going forward, we 
recommend that the United States and China should take the lead in 
convening a global forum—perhaps under the auspices of the WTO 
and WIPO —to bring patent law into the present times, clearly a 
pressing need as advances in AI promise to revolutionize many sectors 
of future economic activity.130 By providing China with a leadership 
role, it is our intention and hope that the country’s leadership would 
retreat from its past practices and embrace a sincere effort to re-
establish and maintain appropriate ownership rights to IP. 
 
127.  See HENRY CHEESEMAN, CONTEMPORARY BUSINESS LAW (8th ed. 2015), especially 
chapters on digital commerce law. 
128.  See authors’ comments in Part IV above USTR Report on China and the WTO. 
129.  In 2017 China became the second largest source of international patent applications 
filed via WIPO. The list was led by two Chinese communications technology firms, Huawei and 
ZTE, followed by Intel, Mitsubishi, and Qualcomm. China at current trends is projected to 
overtake the US within three years as the largest source of applications filed under WIPO’s 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). See China Drives International Patent Applications to Record 
Heights; Demand Rising for Trademark and Industrial Design Protection, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_
0002.html [https://perma.cc/5ZB7-52R6]. 
130.  A study from the WIPO notes a surge in AI based-inventions, led so far by IBM and 
Microsoft. See Michael Castelluccio, WIPO: U.S. and China Lead the World in AI Innovation, 
SF MAGAZINE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://sfmagazine.com/technotes/february-2019-wipo-u-s-and-
china-lead-the-world-in-ai-innovation [https://perma.cc/5SDG-DVL7]. 
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5. The US dollar serves as the de facto global reserve currency,131 
an outcome of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1944 and the political 
and economic realities of that time, as the UK faced massive financial 
problems and could no longer support the British Pound as the reserve 
currency.132 Today, however, there is a general need to depoliticize 
such a critical tool to global commerce, a fact long recognized by other 
nations who have had to conduct their own monetary policy under a 
comprehensive strategic safety net maintained by the United States.133 
In connection with a revitalized 21st Century BWS, the US should 
work with China to build upon ongoing progress to promote China’s 
Renminbi (“RMB,” that is, the “people’s currency”) as a reserve 
currency—a fitting role for the world’s second largest economy. But to 
do so, we acknowledge, China will need to make substantial changes 
to the management of its currency (global hegemons have, for example, 
historically borne the responsibility of maintaining open capital 
accounts and often run trade deficits required to support the system as 
a whole).134 While we advocate for such changes in China’s current 
posture, we also realize that such a transformation will be difficult for 
the country’s leadership. Yet that being said, a refusal to undertake 
them would perhaps be a fatal blow to any possibilities of China 
assuming a global economic leadership role in the context of 
cooperation that we recommend in this paper. 
 
131. The USD is the world’s major reserve currency because most countries choose to 
hold the bulk of their currency reserves in this medium. Historically, to fulfill this role, a country 
must possess liquid financial markets capable of taking in large levels of investment; a reputation 
and proven record of safety and the rule of law that eases security concerns; and a willingness 
to endure current account deficits. Currently only the US maintains all three criteria—and no 
other country has been willing and able to assume such burdens. While China is gradually and 
cautiously seeking such status, it well recognizes this responsibility can cause its currency to 
appreciate, thus dampening economic growth and generating unemployment. Given the 
paramount need to minimize these two outcomes (as the government’s legitimacy depends on 
this), it remains to be seen how enthusiastic China will be to assume such a role. See David 
Lubin, How US Monetary Policy Tamed Chinese Foreign Policy, CHATHAM HOUSE (Jan. 17, 
2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/how-us-monetary-policy-tamed-
chinese-foreign-policy? [https://perma.cc/58D6-4QAG]. 
132.  This reflects the authors’ opinions. 
133.  STEIL, supra note 2. 
134.  See generally work by Barry Eichengreen and particularly, BARRY EICHENGREEN, 
ARNAUD MEHL, AND LIVIA CHITU, HOW GLOBAL CURRENCIES WORK PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE (2019).  
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The recommendations above, obviously, are very crudely 
sketched concepts that beg for greater specificity and clarity. However, 
that is neither our purpose or possibility in the confines of this Article. 
Rather, they are meant to stimulate discussion that will preserve the 
BWS that has served so many so well for so long, but to do so in the 
context of current realities. Those discussions, we believe, should also 
be driven by a common understanding: the need for economic détente 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China before a 
crisis stage comparable to the Cold War stand-off following the end of 
WWII is reached. We are not calling for a surrender of China’s 
economic might in order to “make America great again” or any other 
such humiliation; these recommendations recognize that the People’s 
Republic of China would not memorialize a relatively inferior position 
vis a vis the US in any new reconfiguration of a BWS. As China’s 
economy continues to grow, even at a slower pace than in the past, it is 
reaching a point where it deserves as well as demands a prominent seat 
at the table. It is better to provide this seat peacefully, we hold, than 
risk a catalytic event such as WWI to effect the promotion, testimony 
to what can happen when emotions rather than reason rule the day.135 
Yet while advocating a peaceful reconfiguration of global economic 
relationships, we just as adamantly assert that China needs to engage 
in sincere and verifiable economic reforms if it expects to be awarded 
a prominent presence at the global table. 
Our presumption, then, is that we can reverse the zero-sum game 
mentality that the Trump Administration appears to be pursuing at this 
time regarding China and its economic and political aspirations, 
executed through trade wars, investment restrictions, and other such 
tactics. While the United States might prevail in such a confrontation—
an outcome we think likely at this point in time—it would also prove a 
 
135. It should be noted that the 19th Century hegemon, Great Britain, had reached its 
economic climacteric in the mid-1870s, after which both a newly created Germany and the US 
began to achieve greater economic strength (without either having a reserve currency status). By 
the early 20th Century the US had become the dominant economic power of the world, securing 
global pre-eminence in the wake of the destruction of Europe in World War I. It is precisely 
through an examination of this failed model of global relations—the Great Powers era—that we 
find justification for a reinvigoration of the BWS as perhaps the sole means to retain peace and 
prosperity going forward today. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see ADAM TOOZE, 
THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR, AMERICA AND THE REMAKING OF THE GLOBAL ORDER, 1916-
1931 (2014). 
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Pyrrhic victory at best. This is one key lesson of the era of the Great 
Powers. Accordingly, we advocate openness and transparency in the 
reconfiguration of the rules of the game regarding international trade. 
Doing so would better expose China and its citizens, we believe, to the 
comparative beneficial aspects of what we have termed the Bretton 
Woods System. 
One further dimension to our recommendations, however, 
deserves address. This involves the role of the private sector in 
confronting the challenges of today’s global economy. We maintain 
there is hope for redress through actions and initiatives that an 
enlightened global private sector can and should undertake, within the 
general context of the BWS but through an enlarged role for private 
action in the face of governmental retreat from its obligations, be it by 
the US or elsewhere. While we hardly see this as a panacea for the 
complexity of today’s situation— and as well we fully acknowledge its 
limitations when compared to the powers of state-led and financed 
programs and initiatives136—we nevertheless offer it as an additional 
tool that would prevent what we consider a worse option: the return to 
a world of Great Power rivalries. 
When viewed through the lens of today’s Environmental, Social 
and Governance movement (“ESG”), some of the meta problems 
confronting the world today seem neither intractable nor beyond the 
scope of available financial resources.137 ESG tools that have been and 
can be further channeled to the resolution of social issues that will both 
generate profit and yet still fulfill purpose include the following: 
Socially Responsible Investing; Impact Investing; Corporate Social 
Responsibility; and Agri Business/Ethical Investing, with more such 
structures and initiatives no doubt to follow as this movement grows in 
stature. To fit these private sector investment strategies into the 
parameters of our paper, we would also envision the creation of 
additional financial vehicles and policies that support firms who abide 
by the norms of free and fair trade and refrain from investments in firms 
 
136.  That is, the financial strength of governments and their statutory powers obviously 
provides more resources than a private sector actor could wield. 
137.  See the US-SIF (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment) website 
(https://www.ussif.org) and the UN PRI website (https://www.unpri.org) for information on the 
scope of this asset class. See also the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment. 
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(or countries) that flaunt them.138 Through such actions, we assert, the 
principles that underpin our invoked BWS construct might also be 
applied by private sector actors motivated by social public purpose. In 
this way a retreat from globalization by governments through policies 
of economic nationalism would not necessarily imply a reversion to the 
Great Power politics of the past and all of the ills that it generated. 
Socially responsible private sector actors, we assert, can do much to fill 
this growing void.139 Properly focused private sector investment in 
regions of the world under climate stress, for example, may be able to 
help them become so-called Geopolitically Sustainable Societies 
(“GSS”).140 ESG initiatives represent an opportunity for private sector 
actors to stretch beyond narrowly defined profit objectives of the 
capitalist enterprise and instead achieve outcomes that aid and abet the 
 
138. In its Concept Paper on WTO modernization, the EU recommended that it was crucial 
to bring the WTO and its trade agenda closer to citizens and ensure that trade contributes to the 
pursuit of broader objectives set by the global community, in particular as regards sustainability 
and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specifically, it was recommended that the EU 
prepare an analysis of SDG targets and identify ways in which trade policy could contribute to 
their achievement, and also that the EU should pursue such discussions in the WTO. See EU 
Concept Paper, “WTO Modernisation, Future EU Proposals on Rulemaking.” Accessed at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf. 
139.  However, to be fair we must also acknowledge the risks inherent in such a path—we 
are not as naïve as this view might appear. Not all private sector firms will fulfill outsourced 
public sector tasks traditionally undertaken by public actors only to serve public good 
motivations; in fact, some firms appear to be willing to engage in reprehensible tasks—for a 
profit—specifically to minimize the negative publicity that would redound to the government 
were such tasks to be undertaken. One recent example (among many) involves the founder of 
Blackwater, the US-based defense contractor, and his new firm that recently agreed to build for 
China a “training facility” to process hundreds of thousands of Muslims in China’s western 
provinces in an indoctrination program that ostensibly would break them of their religious 
convictions and in their place instill a respect and love for the Chinese state. The point: the 
private sector cannot automatically be expected to undertake tasks traditionally done by 
governments, thus filling the void created by governmental retreat from international relations. 
We know that some firms and their leaders pursue profit simply for its own sake, regardless of 
the collateral damage it might cause, and will always do so. For details on Blackwater’s founder, 
see Alexandra Stevenson & Chris Buckley, Blackwater Founder’s New Company Strikes a Deal 
in China. He Says He Had No Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/01/business/erik-prince-xinjiang-china-fsg-blackwater.html [https://perma.cc/447L-43GX]. 
140.  There are currently at least 12 global initiatives addressing climate change supported 
by various firms, including oil and gas companies and others that are heavy emitters of fossil 
fuels. These include, among others: The TCFD, We Are Still In; Climate Action 100+; and RE 
100. See NIRI Policy Statement—ESG Disclosure, NAT’L INV. REL. INST. (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.niri.org/NIRI/media/NIRI/Advocacy/ESG-Policy-Statement-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FXT6-UL5L]. 
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underlying principles of the BWS—clearly a beneficial “win-win” 
reward for all involved parties.141 The private sector is neither 
inherently evil nor opposed to the legitimate requirements of the public 
sector. Business firms, we believe, can undertake activities in cross-
border development, finance, and trade that will generate outcomes 
compatible with the foundations of the BWS. They become in effect a 
force multiplier towards this end. 
As we reflect on the 75th anniversary of D-Day and the successful 
conclusion of World War II, we must remember that but a few years 
prior to that—five to be exact—the invasion of Poland by Hitler’s 
troops started an all-consuming war in Europe that soon engulfed the 
entire planet in its horror and destruction. But in the face of looming 
catastrophe, a united leadership of countries with both different 
political systems and histories ultimately arose and soon the forces for 
world redemption stood together to fight the tyranny and oppression 
that Hitler and his cohort of Axis Powers had created. The “greatest 
generation,” we must remember, was not limited to American 
citizenship alone. And today similarly, many of our most pressing 
global problems appear imminently addressable if we can mobilize the 
will to marshal private resources that are clearly available and in 
abundance. While such resources will still require coherent and 
coordinated government oversight, a framework rooted in a stable and 
transparent rule of law can lead to positive outcomes for all. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“No man is an island,” wrote the English poet John Donne nearly 
400 years ago,142 in words that perhaps are even more appropriate in 
today’s deeply interconnected global system. We believe that now 
would be an appropriate time in our history for nations to again come 
together and address collective problems in very much the way our 
predecessors did some seventy-five years earlier. The Bretton Woods 
System was of necessity forged from a ravaged world left in near 
total destruction; while its architects are those celebrated by history, 
such as FDR, Marshall, Keynes, Acheson, Churchill, Truman and 
 
141.  This reflects the authors’ opinion.  
142.  JOHN DONNE, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND, available at https://allpoetry.com/No-man-is-
an-island [https://perma.cc/59YZ-XV3J]. 
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numerous others,143 the bricks and mortar of the structure they built 
were the blood, limbs, and lives of those countless millions lost during 
that tragic time. 
Today we can and indeed must honor their collective sacrifice by 
recommitting ourselves to a renewed and more responsive New World 
Order, that is a reinvigorated Bretton Woods System for the 
21st Century—one that embodies the underlying and enduring 
principles of democracy and markets but does so in the context of 
current realities. Moreover, this also implies that the nations that 
exercised the greatest degree of both political and economic power in 
the post-WWII era—principally the USA—must be willing to share 
that munificence with the emerging nations that will play such a vital 
role in the 21st Century global economy. By finding common ground, 
we can retain the peace and prosperity of the past seventy-five years 
well into this exciting new Century that we mutually inhabit. And if we 
do not, we well may be consigning ourselves to only a temporary and 
transient era of tranquility, one in which underlying forces of 
destruction loom large beneath the shallow veneer of peace. Of this, 
history speaks clearly and convincingly. 
  
 
143.  For a detailed account of the creation of the BWS, see DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT 
THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (Reissue ed. 1987). 
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